Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamic and long-run relationships between monetary policy and asset prices in China using monthly data from June 2005 to September 2010. Johansen's cointegration approach based on vector autoregression (VAR) and Granger causality test are used to identify the long-run relationships and directions of causality between asset prices and monetary variables. Empirical results show that monetary policies have little immediate effect on asset prices, suggesting that Chinese investors may be 'irrational' and 'speculative'. Instead of running away from the market, investors rush to buy houses or shares whenever tightening monetary actions are taken. Such seemingly irrational and speculative behavior can be explained by various social and economic factors, including lack of investment channels, market imperfections, cultural traditions, urbanization and demographic changes. The results have two important policy implications. First, China's central bank has not used and should not use interest rate alone to maintain macro-economic stability. Second, both monetary and non-monetary policies should be deployed when asset bubbles loom large to avoid devastating consequences when they burst.
Introduction
From the 1990s to 2007, monetary policies in most developed economies were dominated by interest rate adjustments which were primarily used to control inflation. China's key monetary policy instruments include not only interest rate but also money supply and bank reserve ratio.
As a concerted effort to fight the current world financial crisis with other G20 economies, China announced a four trillion RMB stimulus package to boost its economy in October 2008. The government also encouraged banks to issue 9.5 trillion RMB new loans in 2009 and 7.95 trillion RMB new loans in 2010. Such a massive capital injection was critical to achieve its ambitious GDP growth target, but at the same time, excess liquidity triggered a huge surge in house prices and general inflation.
. Following a 50% hike in 2009, house prices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen (four first-tier cities) rose from 24% to 42% in 2010. On average, new house prices of Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen climbed to 22,000-24,000 RMB/M 2 , and that of Guangzhou nearly 14,000 RMB/M 2 .
Consumer price index (CPI) reached a 28-month high of 5.1% in November 2010 (EIU ViewsWire, 2010) . All these developments forced the government to act decisively and to shift its monetary policy from being 'appropriately loose' to being 'prudent' (Dyer and Waldmeir, 2010) . Bank reserves ratio was raised eight times to reach 19.5% by February 2011. In the meantime, one-year bank deposit rate and lending rate were raised four times to reach 3.0% and 6.06%, respectively (Yao, 2011) .
Rising house prices during 2008-10 (or share prices during 2006-07) in China was caused not only by excess liquidity but also by irrational or speculative behaviour of consumers and investors as pointed out by Yao and Luo (2009) . Due to asymmetric reactions to gains and losses, investors tend to take excessive risk when prices are rising, but become overcautious when prices are declining.
This paper aims to establish the long-run relationships between asset prices and monetary policy. It also aims to test whether Chinese investors are irrational and speculative when they face rising asset prices. Monthly data from June 2005 to September 2010 are used to construct various econometric models and test a few hypotheses that help answer our research questions. The theoretical underpinning hinges on the dynamic and long-run relationships between monetary policy and asset prices. Koivu (2008) , Laurens and Maino (2007) and Mehrotra (2007) argue that the role of interest rate in China is modest. But, does this mean that interest rate has no effect on asset prices? China's central bank, People's Bank of China (PBOC), closely monitors money supply (M2) and argues that rapid increase in M2 in recent years is not responsible for rising house prices and CPI. Whether these arguments hold true will be answered with our empirical results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the development of China's monetary policy. Section 3 reviews existing literatures on the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents research methodologies and empirical results. Section 6 concludes with some policy recommendations.
Development of China's monetary policy
The Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, Article 5, states that the objectives of monetary policy are to maintain price stability and to promote economic growth (PBOC, 2003) . It has been argued that these two objectives can be contradictory in nature (Xie and Yuan, 2003; Dai, 2002) .
Although PBOC's primary objective is to control inflation, government's overwhelming objective is to stimulate growth (Geiger, 2008; Zhang, 2010; Shu and Ng, 2010) . When there is no excess liquidity, fast economic growth may not necessarily lead to high inflation, as it was in China during the decade before the world financial crisis (Zhang, 2010) . However, when there is a structural shock triggering excess liquidity to maintain high growth, inflation pressure mounts, as it has been in China since the crisis. Figure 1 depicts the movements of two asset price indexes (housing and stock) and two monetary instruments (M2) and inter-bank rate. All the values are measured in indexes (Jan 2008 = 100) and in natural logarithms. It is obvious that interbank rate does not have a close co-movement with other variables, but M2 seems to be a main driving force throughout the data period. China's monetary policy development can be divided into four stages. The first stage was during 1949-84 when PBOC was the country's central bank and only commercial bank (Luo and Yao, 2010) . In reality, however, PBOC acted as an accounting agent for the government (Xie and Luo, 2002 The second period of development started from 1984 when a series of bank reforms were implemented to transform the monopolistic banking system to a decentralized, competitive and profit-oriented system (Yao et al., 2007) . PBOC was officially renamed as the Central Bank and was expected to assist China's transformation to a market-oriented economy. However, it was not until 1993 that an explicit monetary target was announced. The primary intermediate target specified at the time was on currency in circulation and credit control (Laurens and Maino, 2007) .
Hence, 1993 signified the beginning of the third stage development. The Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee (CCPCC) approved "Decisions on Certain Issues in Establishing the Socialist Market Economic System" and proclaimed for the first time that the ultimate target of monetary policy was to maintain currency stability via adjustment in money supply (Geiger, 2008) . This stage of development lasted for five years until 1998 when the credit quota system was abolished. Major reforms during the period included the establishment of money supply announcement system in 1994, the removal of upper limits on interbank lending rates and the specification of monetary intermediary target in 1996 ① . Since then, controlling for broad money supply, M2, has formally become the intermediate target set by PBOC and it has been found to outperform the original bank credit system in predicting future price movements (Yu, 1997; Laurens and Maino, 2007; Porter and Xu, 2009 ).
The fourth stage of development was signified by the State Council's policy 'to maintain currency stability and promote economic growth' in 1998 (Laurens and Maino, 2007) . (Geiger, 2008) . Monetary policy can be defined as a strategy of monetary authority to control money supply and inflation. The basic element of monetary policy is the official interest rate which can be transmitted through a sequence of mechanisms to affect macro-economic stability as well as economic growth.
As shown in Figure 2 , for example, when inflation exceeds a certain target level, the central bank is likely to deploy a contracting strategy by raising the base rate.
In a perfectly liberalized market, any adjustment to the base rate will be displayed as refinancing ② OMOs include national bonds, Central bank bills and financial bonds from other financial institutions. They are market-based instruments and are conducted on a regular, high frequency basis (two days per week-Tuesday and Thursday). The PBOC influences liquidity in the banking system through the issuance and redemption of central bank bills (Dai, 2003; Geiger, 2008; Shu and Ng, 2010) . OMOs were first introduced in 1993. Due to the absence of interbank market and non-liberalized interest rates, OMOs was suspended in 1997. It was re-introduced later in 1998 as a key instrument for monetary policy in China (Geiger, 2008 In China, the impact of interest rate on the economy is less effective due to a number of reasons.
Firstly, the interest rate system has not been fully liberalized (Laurens and Maino, 2007) . Despite growing reliance on OMOs, bank deposit and lending rates are largely dictated by the central bank (Porter and Xu, 2009) . In October 2004, PBOC removed the ceiling on lending rates but retained the ceiling on deposits and the floor on lending rates. Secondly, the banking industry is dominated by four large state-owned banks, which enjoy significant oligopolistic market power (Geiger, 2008) .
Furthermore, because large state-owned enterprises also enjoy huge monopoly power and absorb over 60% of bank loans, they earn huge amount of abnormal profits and hence become insensitive to interest rate changes (Dickinson and Liu, 2007) . The dotted lines in Figure 2 indicate where base rate adjustments may not be effectively transmitted to certain market segments due to lack of competition and the pervasiveness of liquidity constraints (Wan and Zhang, 2002) . Thirdly, despite the establishment of corporate bond and stock markets in early 1990s, bank lending remains the main source of funding for Chinese enterprises, particularly the state-owned enterprises (Liu and Xie, 2006) . Lastly, the specific consumption habit of Chinese consumers has also reduced the effectiveness of interest rate as a monetary policy instrument (Yue and Zhou, 2007) . As Chinese people tend to have a high saving rate, their consumption is not sensitive to interest rate changes, either.
The factors mentioned above imply that China cannot just rely on interest rate for its monetary policy. As a result, PBOC has adopted a series of other policy methods for monetary control (Feyzioglu et al., 2009) . A series of non-central bank policy instruments are also in place to achieve monetary policy targets (Geiger, 2008) .
Literature review
The US credit crunch and a series of monetary policies adopted by central banks of many major industrialized economies to fight the financial crisis have generated huge interest in research on monetary policies and their effectiveness on macro-economic management. In the US and other major western economies, monetary policy targeting on inflation is conducted through interest rate adjustments. However, due to the increasing importance of the real-estate sector to the overall economy, whether monetary policy should include asset price variations in their policy decision has triggered a hectic debate (Taylor, 2007; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Lansing, 2003) .
Although changes in house prices can influence the wider economy through it wealth effect, the Tobin q effect and asset leverage effect, it is argued that interest rates should only be adjusted to control macroeconomic trends rather than house price variations (Taylor, 2007; Feng, 2010; Bernanke and Gertler, 2000) . This is to prevent moral hazard and to ensure that investors are responsible for their own investments. In addition, it is also argued that central banks should not take deliberate steps to prevent or deflate asset bubbles due to the fear of sending the economy into recession (Lansing, 2003) . Instead, policymakers should adopt appropriate strategies to address the consequences of asset bubbles (Greenspan, 2004) .
Studies related to monetary policy in China have a relatively short history and they generally fall into three groups. The first group reviews the evolution of monetary policy (Pan and Xie, 2006; Laurens and Maino, 2007; Geiger, 2008; Zhang, 2010) . Unlike the West, China does not rely on a single monetary policy instrument to achieve its monetary target. Instead, a variety of instruments are adopted. Liu and Zhang (2007) , Geiger (2008) and Porter and Xu (2009) argue that the adoption of a mixture of monetary policy instruments in China was arguably more effective in keeping inflation under control. However, it also leads to various distortions. The application of such policy prevents the interest rate channel of monetary transmission from functioning properly and the influence of interest rate on the real economy remains weak . Further liberalization is warranted to make market rates more responsive to fundamental changes in liquidity and risk characteristics in China (Yue and Zhou, 2007; Porter and Xu, 2009; Zhang, 2009 ).
The second group applies Taylor's rule, McCallum's rule and other internationally accepted measurements to test the suitability of monetary stance in China. The standard Taylor's rule is inadequate to capture China's actual interest rate, particularly in the period before 1996 (Liu and Zhang, 2007) . The deviation between Taylor's rule rate and actual interest rate is mainly caused by delayed policy reaction to economic development (Xie and Luo, 2002) . As China has officially announced that its monetary policy targets on M2, or broad money supply, McCallum's rule is found to be a better fit (Burdekin and Siklos, 2008; Mehrotra and Fung, 2010) . Koivu et al. (2008) confirms the consistency of the rule, in particular in providing inflation related information, whereas Laurens and Maino (2007) argue that PBOC is only able to meet the base money target M1 but not the broad money target. This casts doubt on the controllability of monetary target set by PBOC. Zhang (2009) suggests that the linkage between money supply and inflation has actually become weaker over time. These findings seem to confirm government's intention to shift the monetary policy regime to a price based one as the economy becomes more market-oriented.
Moreover, several studies find evidences that monetary policy reacts counter-cyclically to the output gap and pro-cyclically to the inflation gap (Zhao and Gao, 2009; Mehrotra and Fung, 2010; Shu and Ng, 2010) . Such evidences are consistent with the 'dual legal mandate' of PBOC.
The third group studies the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in China. A responsive, despite weak, relationship has been identified by several studies (Yang and Wang, 2006; Zhao and Gao, 2009; Feng, 2010; . This relationship can be explained by the immaturity of the Chinese housing and stock markets and the dominant power of four large state-owned banks in the financial sector. The recent housing boom has called for the need to incorporate house price variations into monetary policies in China (Zhao and Gao, 2009 ).
Nevertheless, it could only be used as a reference rather than a direct monetary target as house prices in China are highly volatile (Feng, 2010) .
Previous studies provide important insights for our study but few of them have directly examined the relationship between asset bubbles and monetary policy. This paper aims to fill in this literature gap. Unlike previous studies which only prove the existence of a relationship between monetary policy and asset pricing, we focus on the timing, direction and intensity of reactions. Instead of using a single proxy for monetary policy, such as M2, we use a series of proxies to reflect the multiple monetary instruments deployed by PBOC. Both house price and stock market index are examined as these two types of assets are different in nature and respond differently to policy shocks. The results help to identify market irregularities and hence have important policy implications.
Data
China does not have a clear policy rate like the Federal Reserve rate in the US. Money supply (M2) is used as an intermediate target but the growth rate of M2 can deviate significantly from its target without causing high inflation ( Figure 3 ).
As an indirect monetary policy instrument, the market interest rate has become increasingly important in recent years (Laurens and Maino, 2007) . This paper uses M2 and several bank rates as alternative instruments of monetary policy. Bank one-year lending rate is determined by PBOC and acts as the official rate. For market-based interest rates, the 7-day repo rate and interbank rate are used as they have been traded actively and commonly used as benchmarks for pricing other financial assets (Porter and Xu, 2009; Zhao and Gao, 2009 ).
The movements of various interest rates are shown in Figure 4 with their correlation coefficients listed below the figure. The two market-determined rates are highly correlated but less influenced by the official bank rate, suggesting that interest rate liberalization in China is far from complete. The growth of bank credits is another monetary policy instrument. It aims to detect whether the government uses the so-called 'window guidance' to influence bank operations (Koivu, 2010) . The government has frequently used both price (interest rates) and quantity-based (credits and M2) instruments to achieve its monetary goals (Xie and Li, 2010) . To examine the effect of these instruments on asset prices an integrated proxy, R&L, is constructed to represent the dual effects of interest rate and bank reserve ratio. The principle component method is deployed to compile the index using data for real bank lending rates and reserve requirement ratios.
Asset prices refer to stock market indexes and house prices. Stock market indexes include the indexes of both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as well as a combined index of the two.
The combined index is the weighted average of the two indexes by their market sizes. Most studies, e.g., Koivu (2010) Strong uni-directional causality relationship from house price to all monetary policy instruments explains and supports why the government has used all these instruments to achieve its monetary goals. In addition to direct control over M2 and bank loans, the central bank also tries to influence house prices through price methods.
Methodology and results
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In sharp contrast, monetary policy can hardly affect house prices. This may be partially explained by house shortage or other social economic factors. As one of the most important sectors in the economy, the real-estate industry has attracted serious attention by the government. Housing market is managed as an integrated part of fixed asset investment. Therefore, a single policy shock could not exert strong enough impact on house prices. It is worth noting that the combined adjustment of interest rate and bank reserve requirement, as represented by R&L, is found to have a significant bi-directional causality relationship with house prices.
Turning to the relationship between stock market indices and monetary policy instruments, the former has a strong causal relationship with the latter. This result is consistent with that of earlier studies, such as Yi and Wang (2002) . This is because the funding source of firms is closely related to the money market and shares are more actively traded than houses. The growth of bank loans is found to influence share prices uni-directionally. Bank credits could raise share prices in the short term, but the opposite does not hold.
VAR results can be further examined in the form of impulse-response functions (IRFs). The 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals are computed based on 500 replications over 24 periods. Only the variables with long-term cointegration relationship are selected. The following discussion is restricted to the responsive relationship when monetary policy is represented by M2 and interbank rate and asset prices are represented by house prices and the overall stock market index.
④
To ensure consistency, the same lag length as the Granger causality test is applied. Figure 5 shows the IRFs using a Cholesky decomposition of the estimated variance-covariance matrix. As suggested by the causality test, asset prices are placed before monetary policy instruments, reflecting the fact that monetary policy responds more actively to asset price changes than the other way round.
④ The IPR figures between other monetary policy and asset price variables are available on request. A one standard deviation positive shock to M2 would lead to higher house prices. The impact peaked at 0.0059 after 10 months. However, it is surprising that the positive effect of M2 on house prices turns negative after 23 months.
A rise in interbank rate is also found to raise house prices to a maximum of 0.0053 after 15 months. The effect remains positive but starts to fall after reaching its peak.
This result contradicts the general expectation that house prices should react negatively to an increase of bank rate. Focusing on Finland, Sweden and the UK, Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) show an instant and significant decrease in real house prices, about 0.75%-2%, following a rate rise. Negro and Otrok (2005) , Sliva (2008) and Carstensen et al. (2009) have a similar finding for the US house market but the price fall is found to be as large as 13% after a year. A recent study of 17 OECD countries confirms a similar immediate and persistent drop in real property prices in response to a rate rise, with the only exception of Germany where house prices are less affected by monetary policy shocks (Wesche and Gerlach, 2008) .
In China, the simultaneous increase in interbank rate and house price suggests that a contracting monetary stance is ineffective in curbing house prices. For fear of further interest rate rise, people rush to buy more houses, pushing the price up by over 5% in a year. This result has been further confirmed by replacing other monetary policy instruments with bank rates and the R&L index. This 'irrational' behavior can be explained as follows.
First, rapid urbanization and demographic changes imply that there is always a shortage of housing in Chinese cities although more and more houses are built every year.
Second, local governments have exclusive rights to sell lands for house construction.
As a result, they have strong incentives in raising land prices to achieve high revenues. Third, the Chinese culture and traditions imply that house is not just a place to live but a symbol of social status. In most parts of the country, having a house is a pre-requisite for a man to get married (Jia and Liu, 2007) . Consequently, purchasing a house by young people is determined by the timing of marriage, not by a mere interest rate change. Many Chinese families tend to buy houses for their children moving to cities by taking out savings from three generations. When interest rate goes up, families are more likely to bring forward their planned purchase rather than suspend or postpone it until interest rate comes down. This explains the unexpected jumps in house prices in response to an announcement of interest rate or bank reserve ratio rise.
Last but not least, high house prices are also caused by the investment behavior of urban residents. In China, apart from bank savings, there are no other attractive investment opportunities. As a result, housing is not necessarily regarded as a place to live but an important investment channel. Most well-off families tend to buy two or more than two houses, creating even more demand when the market is short of houses.
Furthermore, a significant proportion of rich households buy houses by cash, not by bank loans, making interest rate movements irrelevant to their house-buying decision.
Economic psychology is also important. According to Yao and Luo (2009) As for the shock from asset markets, a positive shock of house prices causes an immediate fall in M2 and rise of interest rate. This is as expected because a counteractive monetary policy would be implemented following a rise in house prices.
Nevertheless, after 9 months, the supply of M2 is found to restore to a positive level.
A contraction in money supply cannot be sustained for long in China as it may hamper economic growth. M2 is expected to grow steadily over time regardless of asset price movements. Therefore, PBOC may prefer to use other mechanisms, such as 'interest rate' and 'window guidance' to cool the housing market down.
To sum up, our results show that an expansionary monetary policy could indeed push up house prices. However, attempts to cool down the housing market through credit control and interest rate adjustments are not as effective in China as in other countries due to a number of special economic and social characteristics. Since market confidence has been restored over the US financial crisis, the Chinese property market has experienced a significant booming period, aided by the generous government A rise in bank rate brings down the stock market index instantly. Nevertheless, after four months, share prices are found to bounce back, suggesting that the responsive relationship is short-lived. Such short-lived share price fall in response to a contracting monetary stance has also been identified by other studies on developed countries (Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Neri, 2004; Wesche and Gerlach, 2008) . However, it would take a much longer period, in about two years for share prices in developed countries to restore to the baseline level and the average maximum price fall is smaller, about 0.75% (Wesche and Gerlach, 2008) than the 1.5% drop in China.
In China, a rise of interest rate could only deter investors for a relatively short period. This is due to the excessive speculative behavior of Chinese investors. Stock market investment is more likely to be considered as a substitute for bank savings as bank deposit rate is usually lower than CPI. Real negative saving rate makes investors highly sensitive to policy changes. However, after the initial turmoil, speculative On the other hand, a positive shock to stock index is found to cause a contraction in money supply in the mid-term. The change in M2 only turns negative after one year and bottoms out in 17 months. Such a long response period may be due to the fact that the impact of stock markets on the economy is less significant than that of the housing market.
To test the robustness of our results, two types of restrictions are added to the VAR model: short run restriction where monetary policy does not contemporaneously react to asset prices, and long-run restriction which is inspired by money neutrality, e.g., money should not have a long-run effect on real variables. Based on US data, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) Such 'irrational' and 'speculative' investment behaviour, however, can be explained by various economic, social and cultural factors which are unique to China. Rapid urbanization, attitude towards home ownership, lack of investment channel and imperfect market competition are some of the key factors responsible for large stock market and housing bubbles.
As for the causal relationships between monetary instruments and asset prices, there are also some interesting results. The government paid more attention to house price movements than to share price changes. When house prices were rising rapidly, both the government and PBOC reacted quickly and aggressively to cool down the market.
In contrast, it took more than one year for the government to tighten its monetary stance to cool down the stock market when it was ballooning. There may be two explanations for the different attitudes of the government towards intervening into the two asset markets.
One explanation is that the housing market is more important than the stock market in terms of their potential impact on the wider economy. The other explanation may be due to experience-learning. Because of government's slow reaction to the stock market in 2006-07, the stock market bubble became so large that it could not recover to half its peak level reached in 2007 after more than three years. If the housing market bubble were to be as large as the stock market bubble, the potential damage to the Chinese economy and society would be devastating. As a result, the government decided to intervene aggressively in the housing market in 2010 and continued to do so into 2011.
Although such government actions may not really cool down the housing market as we have discussed and found out from our empirical evidences in this paper, the housing bubble may not be able to become too large to have a devastating impact on the economy once it eventually bursts.
From the results found in this paper and additional anecdotal evidence, it can be seen that Chinese investors have a strong but irrational economic psychology in the sense that people tend to take excessive risks when asset prices are rising. This kind of investment behavior can be observed in any part of the world, but in China, due to various other special factors, such irrational and speculative behavior is particularly strong. This will have important policy implications. Apart from acting early and more aggressively, the Chinese government should try to create more investment channels, to promote a fairer and better free market system, to shift its economic structure which will depend less on investment and more on effective domestic consumption.
